Matching Investment to Strategy: Preparing the Department of Defense for the Future
The new Bush Administration promises watershed changes for the military establishment beginning with a new strategy for the 21 st century international environment. Its ongoing strategic review has been billed as a close scrutiny of forces and capabilities which may lead to disposing Cold War weapons in favor of forces oriented towards future threats. Transformation is the theme today although the end-state, if there is one, is uncertain. It is "presumably… a change in the structure and composition of the armed forces to become something new and more
The question that needs to be asked isn't just about how the military should change --it's about reshaping the Department of Defense (DoD) so that it can change and to adapt to new doctrine and threats. After all, the Department has been touting "jointness" for over fifteen years and progress in that direction has been slow. 2 Expecting transformation from an organization that has found it very difficult to solve even basic interoperability issues for existing systems is extremely optimistic at best. The challenge becomes doubly daunting in that (1) there is no outside threat or peer competitor to act as a forcing function for change and (2) the current configuration of forces has been pretty successful in recent outings. There are unknown risks in moving from a successful and robust posture to something different.
Enabling Transformation
"Often the problem is not so much coming up with new ideas but doing something with them." 6 To successfully effect change in the Department of Defense --whether it's described as jointness or transformation --at least three elements must be in place. First, there must be toplevel long-term support and clear direction. Corporate management must be able to describe the vision or end-state to be achieved; that vision should be shared by leaders throughout the organization. Within the DoD, the end-state should be mutually reinforced by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff vision documents (e.g., Joint Vision 2020) and the Defense Planning
Guidance signed by the Secretary of Defense.
Second, advocates and innovators must keep new ideas alive and visible within the strategic planning process. Most good ideas start off on a fragile upward turn of a sine wave of enthusiasm and exploration. If not fostered and tested, the idea quickly moves down the other side of the wave and is smothered and lost. The advocate's role is to gather, evaluate and systematically insert new ideas and approaches into on-going programs and plans. Proponents for change are the institutional supports to counteract a natural organizational tendency to keep doing "business as usual." For DoD transformation, a combination of the OSD staff and Joint
Staff supported by Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) will serve a primary advocates.
Finally, resources must be directed to the change agents (the organizations) and designated transformation programs. Without dedicated money and people nothing happens.
Joint experimentation, simulation and modeling programs for requirements validations, and joint training are areas where increased funding over time could boost the transformation process.
Establishing or building up the three factors --top level direction, systemic advocacy, and resources --gives us the azimuth for the needed corrective action. But first, we need to understand why transformation is the new imperative.
Stretching the Dollars --Why Transformation Is Hard and Necessary
The call for defense transformation has been growing since the Gulf War victory. The National Defense Panel report on the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review, emphasized the "need to launch a transformation strategy now that will enable [the U.S.] to meet a range of security challenges in 2010 to 2020." 7 A whole literature of articles, books, and speeches has emerged on the topic. Most writers emphasize the changing external threats, potential of emerging capabilities, growth of asymmetric challenges and dynamic world environment. Sometimes overlooked is that fact that change is urgently needed to sustain military effectiveness in the absence of increased defense spending. Both strategic interests and funding constraints drive the answers to where and how U.S. forces may intervene around the world. These factors define the internalities: how many forces; how they are organized; and what ways and means are available to policy makers.
The Clinton Administration's priority was to reduce budget deficits --and to do that, they continued cuts in defense spending. 8 It chose to support readiness and engagement and deferred procurement of new systems. The Reagan build-up had left a legacy of weapons and platforms that afforded the opportunity for a 'procurement holiday'. That legacy is now nearly exhausted and the incoming Bush Administration, whose first priority is tax cuts, is in a very different 7 Report of the National Defense Panel, "Transforming Defense -National Security in the 21 st Century," Washington, D.C, (December 1997): i. 8 Defense spending started declining in the mid-1980's under Reagan and continued with President Bush's effort to find a peace dividend. President Clinton kept the DoD budget on a downward glide path until 1998. starting spot. They are looking at a military establishment that is heavily engaged overseas and burdened with an aging inventory and insufficient equipment pipeline.
The strategic review now underway at the Pentagon is supposed to come up with a strategy, and presumably new spending priorities, adapted to future world conditions. It's not the first try. "Similar reviews in 1991, 1993 and 1997 all set out to restructure the military --and all failed. They did result in smaller forces and reductions in major weapons purchases. Yet the forces and weapons themselves changed surprisingly little."
9 Conservatism in military thinking
should not be surprising. There is a real reluctance to give up successful weapons and forces. It is a risk-averse culture with strong constituency networks built around institutions and programs.
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Looking back, the DoD has managed to avoid change by feeding the current organizations and programs albeit on a highly restricted diet. However, in practice the resource management system is stressed: funds programmed for one purpose are spent on others. "To resolve the program-funding mismatch, Defense Department leaders continually shifted funds programmed for modernization to support current operations. This almost certainly is subversive of efforts at Service transformation. When, for instance, in 1994 the Navy 'volunteered' to go below its authorized fleet size in order to free funds to develop future capabilities, senior defense officials took much of the anticipated savings to offset budgetary shortfalls." 11 Engagement strains the readiness paradigm because training and maintenance funds end up paying for deployments. To stretch available dollars over the most programs possible (actually terminating a program is rare), many initiatives are left funded at uneconomical production rates. As described by Admiral Owens, "..the four service branches have shaved their budgets wherever they can --postponing new equipment upgrades, making do with old technology and suffering serious personnel shortages --rather than deal with the fundamental change in military policy that is required of them…It was a short-term bureaucratic victory that has sown the seeds for disaster."
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One solution lies with increasing the defense budget now that the federal spending has moved out of the red into surplus territory. 13 But those projected budget surpluses quickly disappear after paying for some of the Administration's higher priority initiatives. The proposed tax cut, social security set-aside, education, and prescription drug benefits are all competing with possible defense increases. Besides, the magnitude of needed additional funding may be simply politically unacceptable. 14 Despite a defense budget today over $300 billion, the Congressional Owens: 39. 13 Others argue that defense is more than amply funded for a low-threat environment. "The U.S. today spends more on defense than the NATO allies, Japan, and South Korea combined. Our nation's $281 billion defense budget in 1998 (compared with the NATO allies' total of $202 billion) represented 34 percent of all world military spending, up from 30 percent in the previous decade. The Pentagon budget dwarfed the military spending of Russia ($40 -$64 billion) and China ($37 billion)." Owens: 3-4. 14 Some advocates have argued that defense spending should be tagged to a GDP level, such as the 6 to 7% of GDP that defense employed during the Cold War. This approach is backwards in that budgets are built to meet strategic requirements not to absorb specified levels of tax revenues. The absence of funding added to the defense topline (at least so far) suggests two things.
First, the Administration wants to secure the tax cut package before opening the dialogue on defense. 19 Second, the military community may be in for some traumatic shocks. The only way that transformation can, in the long run, fit within a slow growth defense budget is to reduce DoD's appetite for mass, large production runs, and force structure. The high cost of stealth and precision will make large inventories unaffordable. Redundant weapons and logistics systems, large stockpiles of munitions, and base and range capacity will be too expensive. With transformation, these reductions should be acceptable because jointness, precision, and information superiority will compensate for added risk by making the smaller force more effective and efficient. The idea of skipping a generation of weapons to focus on new technologies is just a way of saying that the procurement holiday goes on a while longer --and the Services will have to adjust. 16 The Administration is however interested in a new and expensive national missile defense system that will require additional billions. Estimates range from $60 to $90 billion over currently planned levels, without adding in the usual cost overruns and schedule slips. • The Task Force Hawk deployment to Kosovo exposed a number of problems, including the large logistic footprint and delays in operational readiness. But fundamentally, the Army and Air Force could not work together in theater. "The story here is that joint doctrine is a colossal failure." 28 The Army rejected adding their helicopters to the Air Force controlled "air tasking order." As related by Admiral Owens:
The Apaches were unable to integrate with support assets such as the E-8 JSTARS aircraft, the EC-130 Compass Call (radar) jamming aircraft and the F-16CJs equipped to defeat Serbian air defenses… Sixteen years after Grenada --during which Army ground troops found themselves unable to communicate with Navy carrier aircraft providing critical close-air support on the battlefield --the Army and Air Force assets rushed to Kosovo still could not communicate with one another… No one has ever serious envisioned including Army aviation into a theater strategic air campaign. Everybody trains, organizes, and equips to their service doctrine.. When the services come to a war, they come with their service doctrines, not a joint doctrine.
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Fixing "joint" deficiencies is critical for transformation and full spectrum dominance. 30 It means building joint doctrine, true system interoperability, collaborative planning tools, common views of the battlefield with netted sensors and communications, and joint training.
Transformation also will require breaking open some of the stovepipes that dominate the "organize, train, and equip" functions of the services. Owens: 199. 30 The concept of "full spectrum dominance" raises another set of issues. The challenge will be to find performance objectives for the Joint Vision 2020 elements. Without metrics that indicate success, "full spectrum dominance" could become a black hole for resources. 31 "Train, organize, and equip" are the legal Title X responsibilities given to the Services. This phrase has been used as a shield against unwanted direction, primarily OSD. with joint capabilities and outcomes in mind. The illustration below captures the essential change in mind-set, responsibilities and planning that is required. 33 Service core competencies will be assessed through the filter of what they bring to the joint fight.
Altering the defense community will be an uphill battle. 34 Creating an adaptive, flexible, integrated and multi-dimensional fighting force out of an organization built on hierarchy, control, stability, career predictability, command and Service separatism will be tough. To succeed, the structures and processes underlying defense decision-making and resource allocation will need to adopt a bias towards joint action, change and innovation. 35 Critical steps include revamping the resource structure so that investment choices are visible, capabilities are measured across Services, and a constituent network advocating innovation is developed and institutionalized.
Altering the decision process is crucial; it is naïve to keep pulsing the same players and processes and expect different outcomes. 35 Perhaps the most important missing ingredient is trust. Commanders must 'trust' that supplies will, in fact, be delivered "just in time." Unit forces must 'trust' that other service elements in the integrated battlefield will be ontime and on-target. Without trust, people cannot let go of their stockpiles and service-unique systems. But that's a subject for another paper. 
The Planning, Programming and Budgeting System
The PPBS is the corporate process that DoD uses to set goals, identify requirements and allocate resources to support the strategy. It was instituted forty years ago to:
• "Describe the strategic environment and define the military capabilities it requires, 45 From personal experience in drafting DPG language, the process is painfully encumbered by efforts to either retain current verbiage or insert that one phrase that supports a new pet program. The result is vague guidance that directs more than is affordable and gives the Services the freedom to pick and choose which guidance to follow. Finally, the DPG is sometimes published after the Services have already substantially completed their annual programs, rendering it useless.
Three steps are necessary to make the DPG truly useful:
• Eliminate the working groups that draft the DPG. The participants have all mastered the bureaucratic slow-roll which produces a bland and nondirective consensus document. Establish a small OSD-level group that writes the DPG based on the National Security Strategy, National
Military Strategy, and the Chairman's Program Recommendations. 46 The latter document has 44 Setting up a Major Force Program specifically for Jointness or Transformation may be counterproductive. Services would identify pet projects as "joint" to ensure high priority for funding. Over time, most programs would be in that category --rendering the distinction useless. 45 Business Executives for National Security, "Changing PPBS," a BENS Special report (2000) available at www.bens.org/pub/PPBS 46 The small staff injunction is invoked for 2 reasons: (1) simplify the writing process and (2) help break the bureaucratic mind-set that DPG is another target of opportunity for manipulating future budgets.
recently been formatted along the lines of the Joint Vision initiatives so it is easier to identify critical transformation programs. Limit service participation to an advisory memorandum from the individual Service Secretaries to the Secretary of Defense. With these parameters, the Chairman's Program Recommendations would gain significance and could become a strong advocacy document for Joint Vision initiatives.
• Specify reportable goals and outcomes for each MFP. The DPG is the first line of defense against the strategy-resource mismatch; complying with its guidance must be affordable.
Do the front-end analysis establishing priorities for weapons and programs before the DPG is published so that it is written with specific guidance for each MFP and sub-programs. Specify outcomes and outputs for the program period for each MFP, and as possible, for each distinct capability or mission area within the MFP. For example, set benchmarks for strike, ground maneuver, and air superiority. Indicate the priority for the capability and the supporting systems so that it is clear which programs should be fully funded versus those funded at higher level of risk. Programs identified as essential for transformation could be designated as the highest priority for funding.
Increased specificity elevates the DPG from a benign advisory document to true direction and would, in effect, centralize key decisions that had in the past been left to the Services. There are two other positive consequences: (1) it shift the time and place for articulating requirements out of programming into the front end analysis phase and (2) by narrowing the guidance to affordable priorities the DPG informs both the White House and the Congress of capability limitations. It raises the strategy-resource mismatch issue out of the Service-level forum to a more appropriate level.
• For years the notion of budget share has damaged DoD's credibility that funds are actually placed against the highest priority requirements. The New York Times noted:
Neither the first Bush administration nor the Clinton administration dared break with the tradition of slicing the defense budget into unchanging shares for each of the military departments. From the end of the Vietnam War until the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Army claimed 29 percent of spending, the Department of the Navy 37 percent, and the Air Force 34 percent. Those shares remain essentially unchanged today; at most, 1 percent of the defense budget has migrated from one service to another since 1990. Indeed, much of what passed for military strategy in the reviews of the last decade look more like a rationale, invented after the fact, for equal defense reductions across the services --reductions that failed to reshape the forces in any fundamental way. The supposed sanctity of the service budget share drove the shape of the Base Force concept proposed after the end of the Cold War. As noted by Admiral Owens, Even [General] Powell could not challenge the long-entrenched separatism of the four armed services, which paralyzed the decision-making process. He knew that the Pentagon had no formal decision-making process through which he could even undertake a discussion of changes that would hit one service harder than the others. There would be a real fight if the Pentagon leadership were to cut the services disproportionately --even it was the right thing to do. His position hardened into insisting on the imposition of equal cuts across the board as the only way to reach a compromise.
50
In theory at least, the basic rule of resource allocation is to fund the highest requirements first. Dividing the total budget to protect a notional share of the resource pie, regardless of need abrogates that rule. It diverts money and manpower from high priority requirements to supports and protects lower priority programs. This tradition-bound concept that undermines strategic planning by looking backwards, not ahead.
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Two different approaches could alter the budget-share mind-set. First, "tiered programming" that illuminates priorities could be a near-term approach. For the long-term though, allocating funds by capability may be the best approach to reinforce jointness. Each approach is described below.
• Tiered Programming. With this approach, the services and agencies would be asked to submit their spending programs at 90%, 100%, and 110% of their projected fiscal guidance.
up" review by looking at marginal opportunity costs and benefits. The danger of course is that gamesmanship takes over but firm guidance from the leadership may be able to dampen the excesses. 53 Tiered programming illuminates trade-offs in the short term allowing time to develop the analytical frameworks needed for capability based programming.
• 56 DAWMS was an attempt to figure out which weapons were most valuable for the Deep Attack. It was not used for programming resources because (1) the Services could not agree on the assumptions underlying the study and (2) could transfer resources to the more productive, and therefore higher priority, systems. The advantage is that this perspective looks at DoD as an integrated effort, rather than a collection of unrelated programs. PPBS can be revitalized by realigning the FYDP to strategy, providing specific guidance, allocating fiscal guidance based on requirements and actually holding the services accountable for meeting objectives. These changes would reinstate PPBS system as a true strategic planning system --not just a bureaucratic paper mill building an annual budget. In that light, a stronger PPBS process with clear direction would help improve the responsiveness of the Department to strategic and resources changes. It is a basic step in creating a more adaptable and accountable organization for the future.
Assigning Responsibilities for Transformation
Chain of command and unity of effort are basic military tenets --but wholly absent from the transformation quest. The vacancy appears to be by design and is consistent with the slowly evolving role of JFCOM. 58 The fact remains that because no one is fully responsible or accountable for making transformation work, transformation becomes a service or agency choice not an imperative. JFCOM has the lead for operationalizing the capabilities envisioned in Joint Vision 2020. 59 But there is no enforcement mechanism to ensure the services follow. What's the Experimentation --a step in the right direction but not fully funding the requirement. The problem was that the Congress accelerated an experiment planned for FY 2004. The budget requirements were still being worked developed during the program review. Rather than basing funding on poor estimates, the PDM kicked the issue to the budget cycle in hopes that better information would be available then. 58 In 1993, the Unified Command Plan assigned JFCOM's predecessor (USACOM) responsibility for joint training; in 1995, integration and interoperability were added; in 1999, JFCOM gained joint experimentation. Today JFCOM is a hybrid organization: charged with futures work but also the provider of trained and integrated joint forces. 59 The description provided is taken from the lecture given by General Kernan, Commander of U.S. Joint Forces Command, at the National War College, April 12, 2001. problem? Three factors are readily apparent. First, the services object to intrusions into their Title X territory of "organize, train, and equip." Second, the services and CINCs may oppose establishing JFCOM as a "superCINC" with primary responsibility for determining future forces.
The unstated collaborative approach is much less threatening to missions and systems. Finally, the Joint Staff is also responsible for future initiatives, experimentation and interoperability.
Overlaps in responsibilities make it difficult to assign specific roles. Nonetheless, the task must be tackled. If no one is put in charge of pulling transformation together, it won't happen.
Recommended changes for strengthening responsibility and accountability are:
( • Requirements are pushed, from the bottom up, by the Services rather than responding to mission area deficiencies identified at the joint level.
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• Requirements are reviewed sequentially rather than as part of a family of systems operating in a mission area.
• The Joint Staff does not have a criteria for validating requirements. Scenarios vary, the services methodologies are inconsistent and analytic tools are weak.
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• Interoperability has been an afterthought rather an a critical performance parameter.
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To remedy these weaknesses, the JROC staff must have the tools and operational architecture for modeling the capabilities of all service systems together in likely scenarios.
Such tools would enable comparative assessments and help avoid optimizing capability at the wrong level. Having the "state-of-the-art" system may be great by itself --but it may not work well or be necessary in an integrated environment. At a minimum, every system should be evaluated in the integrated, joint context for that mission area before requirements are accepted.
The Joint Simulation and Modeling System (JSIMS), now in development, will be a distributed joint synthetic battlefield supporting training at the strategic-theater and operational levels of war for CINC and Joint Task The problem is that JFCOM is not in charge of the effort but acts as a facilitator, providing an experimental framework for the services to "shape and showcase their core 
Conclusion
Joint Cohesive Operations, the goal of jointness and transformation, is DoD's likely strategy for the early 21 st century. It presents force integration, rather than separatism or centralization, as the path in a future "where the cost and operational complexity of systems will increase substantially" but without commensurate increases in spending. 76 The imperative remains effectiveness on the battlefield. The challenge will be sustaining enough centralized direction so that the services and agencies proceed together towards a transformed force.
To enable transformation, the Department will have to change itself --strengthening the centralized direction while encouraging innovation and experimentation. Tough choices, requiring substantive analysis on future needs, lie ahead. To a large degree, "managing change is what national security is all about." 77 The recommendations provided in this paper are a first step to improving our insight and foresight in managing transformation. They revitalize the strategic planning system and strengthen the bias towards jointness within the key military forum for requirements, the JROC. Jointness will eventually become not just a layer inserted in the warfighting structure or a buzzword attached to the front of any program --but an integral part of training, planning, and thinking about military operations. 76 Rokke, Ervin J., "Military Education for the New Age," Joint Force Quarterly (Autumn 1995): 19. 77 Rokke: 21. 
